Perceptions and Reality
理想与现实
Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950
1950年在朝鲜半岛的两个战略情报失误
P. K. Rose
0n 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) swept across the 38th parallel and came close to uniting the Korean peninsula under the Communist regime of Kim Il-sung. American military and civilian leaders were caught by surprise, and only the intercession of poorly trained and equipped US garrison troops from Japan managed to halt the North Korean advance at a high price in American dead and wounded. Four months later, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) intervened in massive numbers as American and UN forces pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel. US military and civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly price was paid in American casualties.
1950年6月25日，朝鲜人民军全面突破38线向韩国发起进攻，以期统一朝鲜半岛。美国的领导人们大为震惊，慌乱中只能派遣驻扎在日本的训练不足装备短缺的守备部队前往战争一线，在人民军凌厉的攻势下，美军伤亡惨重。4个月后，当美军和联合国军击溃人民军并越过38线后，中国人民解放军大军入朝参战，美国的领导人们又一次震惊了，美军再次遭受了重大伤亡。
Two strategic intelligence blunders within six months: yet the civilian and military leaders involved were all products of World War II, when the attack on Pearl Harbor had clearly demonstrated the requirement for intelligence collection and analysis. The answers to why it happened are simple, and they hold lessons that are relevant today.
六个月内连续两次出现战略情报的重大失误：美国的领导人们都刚经历过二战，珍珠港事件已经表明了情报收集和分析的重要性。为何领导人们一次又一次的震惊？答案十分简单，而且现在他们又被上了一课。
The role of intelligence in America's national security is often misunderstood. Intelligence information has to exist within the greater context of domestic US political perception. With the defeat of Japan, our historically isolationist nation moved quickly to look inward again. The armed forces were immediately reduced in number, defense spending was cut dramatically, and intelligence resources met a similar fate. The looming conflict with Communism was focused on Europe, our traditional geographic area of interest.
美国国家安全情报的规则常被误解，情报工作总是要服从国内的政治环境。随着日本投降，我国历史上的孤立主义再次抬头，部队裁员，国防支出大量削减，而情报工作也面临同样的窘境。我们把注意力都放到了欧洲——美国的传统战略重心。
The war had produced a crop of larger-than-life military heroes, and perhaps the biggest was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Far East Commander and virtual ruler of a defeated Japan.
二战成就了大批战斗英雄，其中光环最耀眼的一位非道格拉斯•麦克阿瑟将军莫属——远东地区美军总司令和日本的实际统治者。
While many considered MacArthur brilliant, his military career also contained numerous examples of poor military judgment. He had few doubts about his own judgment, however, and for over a decade had surrounded himself with staff officers holding a similar opinion. MacArthur was confident of his capabilities to reshape Japan, but he had little knowledge of Chinese Communist forces or military doctrine. He had a well-known disregard for the Chinese as soldiers, and this became the tenet of the Far Eastern Command (FEC).
尽管英雄的光环十分耀眼，但是麦克阿瑟的军事生涯中有不少低级失误。他不承认这点，而且他身边的参谋军官们也持同样的观点。麦克阿瑟对于改造日本社会显得信心十足，但是他对新中国的军事力量所知甚少。众所周知，麦克阿瑟很是蔑视中国的军力，这也成为了远东司令部的共识。
In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly declared a defensive containment line against the Communist menace in Asia, based upon an island defense line. The Korean peninsula was outside that line.
1950年1月，国务卿艾奇逊公开宣称要建立一条基于第一岛链的抵御“共产主义威胁”的防线，而朝鲜半岛恰好位于这条防线的外围。
Still, America viewed Korea as one of several developing democratic nations that could serve as counterbalances to Communist expansion. In March 1949, President Truman approved National Security Council Memorandum 8/2, which warned that the Soviets intended to dominate all of Korea, and that this would be a threat to US interests in the Far East. That summer, the President sent a special message to Congress citing Korea as an area where the principles of democracy were being matched against those of Communism. He stated the United States "will not fail to provide the aid which is so essential to Korea at this critical time."
美国人视韩国为阻止共产主义扩张的桥头堡。1949年3月，杜鲁门总统签署通过了8/2国家安全备忘录，强调苏联有意控制整个朝鲜半岛，进而威胁美国在远东的利益。同年夏天，杜鲁门总统对国会说，民主制的韩国是对抗共产主义的重要力量，他宣称美国“在这个关键时刻，不会吝啬给予韩国的一切必要援助。”
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